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1.  Introduction 
 
In 2013, the United States’ National Institutes of Health (NIH) began phasing out the use of 
chimpanzees for invasive research. In 2015, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service categorized 
chimpanzees in captivity as endangered, requiring a permit to use them in invasive research.1  
One reason that the NIH phased out the use of chimpanzees for research was that requests to 
use the NIH’s stable of chimpanzees were rare. Instead, the scientific community was finding 
other ways to answer the questions that may have also been answered by invasive research on 
chimpanzees. In other words, they were using other animal models: mice, rats, dogs, pigs, 
rabbits, and other non-human primates. This phase out was further motivated by the Institute of 
Medicine’s recommendations for the use of chimpanzees in biomedical and behavioral research.2 
They set conditions for acceptable use of chimpanzees in research. For biomedical research, the 
conditions are that no other suitable model be available, that the research can’t be conducted 
ethically with humans, and that forgoing the use of chimpanzees would significantly inhibit 
research. For behavioral research the conditions are that the sought insight be otherwise 
unattainable and that the researchers use acquiescent animals. 
Conducting research on animals is supposed to be valuable because it provides information 
on how human mechanisms work. But for the use of animal models to be ethically justified, it 
must be epistemically justified. The inference from an observation about an animal model to a 
conclusion about humans must be warranted for the use of animals to be moral (it’s a necessary, 
but not sufficient, condition of the ethical use of animals for research). In what follows, I am 
concerned with the epistemology of this inference. 
Much has been written on the ethics of research using non-human primates. Most of the 
debate on the use of animals in research, and especially the use of non-human primates, has been 
around the ethical appropriateness of such research. Substantially less has been written on the 
epistemology of using animal models to contribute to knowledge about humans, especially the 
Penultimate draft, please cite final version forthcoming in Journal of Applied Philosophy 
2 
epistemic appropriateness of using non-human primates as models. It is often simply assumed 
that non-human primates are a good research model. Usually when authors object to the use of 
non-human primates it is on ethical grounds. I object to their use as models on epistemic 
grounds.  
When researchers infer from animals to humans, it’s an extrapolation. Animals are obviously 
similar to humans in some ways and obviously different in others. Extrapolating from animals to 
humans negotiates these similarities and differences, ideally in a way that warrants a conclusion 
about humans.3 For extrapolation to be warranted, research must be thoughtfully designed and 
analyzed to exploit the similarities and control the differences. 
Invasive research on chimpanzees was supposed to provide a good animal model from which 
researchers could extrapolate information about humans, as the negotiation of the similarities and 
differences between the model population (chimpanzees) and the target population (humans) was 
less problematic. But the recent policy changes about the use of chimpanzees for research only 
impacts their use for invasive research;4 behavioral research on chimpanzees (and other non-
human primates) is still politically unproblematic and widely accepted in the scientific 
community as a good animal model from which researchers can justifiably extrapolate to target 
populations. So it’s not as though chimpanzees (and other non-human primates) are no longer 
being used as animal models. It’s just that they’re no longer being used as animal models in 
invasive research. They are still widely used as animal models in behavioral research.5 But, as I 
argue below, the epistemology of the extrapolation from non-human primates for laboratory 
behavioral research does not warrant their use as animal models. Laboratory behavioral research 
on non-human primates is unreliable and so conclusions from it unjustified 
In the next section, I identify the goals of conducting laboratory behavioral research on non-
human primates and the reasons for selecting non-human primates as models. I then introduce 
my argument, which is a dilemma, the conclusion of which is that extrapolations from laboratory 
behavioral research on non-human primates are unjustified. The conclusion is not that 
extrapolations from non-human primates are unjustified, or even that extrapolations from non-
human primates in behavioral research are unjustified. Rather, experimental conditions necessary 
to conduct the experiment defeat the justification for extrapolated conclusions that result from 
such experiments.6  
I do make some uncontroversial epistemological assumptions. One is that there is no prima 
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facie justification that animal models are suitable for extrapolation—that they are suitable is a 
conclusion that needs to be positively supported with evidence. The burden is on the defender of 
extrapolation from animal models to provide this evidence.  This is true not only as a general 
point about the suitability of animal models but also of every individual study in which animal 
models are used. I also assume that even if one can provide evidence in support of a claim, this 
evidence is defeasible, either by further evidence that cuts against the truth of the supporting 
evidence, or by evidence that the process used to generate the supporting evidence is unreliable 
(not likely to yield truths).  
2. Goals of NHP research 
There are three goals to conducting laboratory behavioral research on non-human primates. 
The first is to extrapolate from observations about them to conclusions about human behavior. 
This is straightforward enough. Researchers induce fear or anxiety into a rhesus monkey and 
observe its behavior and neural activity. Or researchers play the Ultimatum Game with confined 
chimpanzees.7  From these experiments, we are supposed to learn how humans respond to fear or 
anxiety and how humans respond to perceived unfairness.  
A second goal is to use these experiments to extrapolate to a different target population: other 
non-human primates.8 Researchers observe an infant rhesus monkey cower in fear and 
extrapolate that some more general class of non-human primates are likely to exhibit the same 
behavior. 
The third goal builds off both of these extrapolations. Experimental behavioral research on 
non-human primates generates observations, from which conclusions about all primates can be 
extrapolated. Such extrapolations are supposed to inform us about how different species evolved. 
One way this is can occur is by identifying homologous behavior, or similar behaviors in animals 
that have a common ancestor.9 Another way this can occur is by identifying convergent behavior, 
which is when different species exhibit the same behavior as result of environmental factors 
rather than from having a common ancestor.  
So, for example, inducing fear into a variety of non-human primate species and observing the 
responses may allow one to extrapolate to the claim that all non-human primates of a particular 
genus exhibit similar behaviors, but that other genii do not. Such a conclusion, if justified, would 
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be scientifically informative, as it may indicate how fear responses have evolved and, in turn, the 
evolutionary history of the different species. Similarly, observing a variety of non-human 
primate species’ responses to unfairness may allow one to extrapolate to a conclusion about how 
our ancestors’ and human social psychology has evolved. If justified, these are scientifically 
informative conclusions. 
These are the three targets of extrapolation from laboratory behavioral research on non-
human primates: humans, other primates, and general conclusions about primates and how they 
evolved. As I argue below, the epistemology of laboratory behavioral research on non-human 
primates fails to support conclusions about any of these targets. 
3.  Why NHP? 
There are seven National Primate Research Centers in the United States. At each center 
behavior and psychology are major areas of research focus.10 Hundreds of millions of dollars are 
allocated to them. The implication of this focus at these centers is that the researchers conducting 
the studies and the administrators funding it believe that laboratory research using non-human 
primates is valuable. And for it to be valuable, it must be epistemically justified. It may be that 
not all of this research is extrapolative. Some research may not be intended to generalize to other 
populations. Instead, some of the research may focus on merely better understanding a specific 
species under specific conditions. But certainly much of the research is intended to provide a 
model for extrapolation. Phillips et al. write that “NHPs are used because of their similarity to 
humans in physiology, neuroanatomy, reproduction, development, cognition, and social 
complexity.”11 If this is the reason non-human primates are selected, then their use assumes that 
extrapolative inferences are justified. Further, these similarities are supposed to warrant 
continued laboratory research on non-human primates, including research on behavior. 
Laboratory behavioral research in particular is warranted because “Similarities in social and 
environmental complexity allows for ethologically relevant input to behavioral paradigms for 
social cognition.”  
Whether one animal is similar to another depends on what properties of the animals one is 
interested in, or which properties are relevant. 12,13 For the present purposes, it is enough to note 
that a variable can be causally relevant by inhibiting a certain effect, whether it causes it or not. 
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Non-human primates are supposed to be similar to humans in many relevant ways but not 
different in relevant ways, and are far more accessible than humans to subject to research. The 
science would be best if humans could be used. But for various reasons, humans are not 
accessible, usually because it would be unethical to use them. But other animals such as rats, 
pigs, dogs, mice, rabbits, and non-human primates can be bred, sold, confined, manipulated, and 
euthanized, all relatively cheaply. And they’ll never miss a follow-up visit. They are logistically, 
ethically, and fiscally more accessible than human subjects.  
Indeed, many non-human primates are small enough to keep and breed in normal-sized 
buildings; and their disposal does not typically raise alarm. Even the great apes can spend their 
lives under confinement and control much more cheaply than humans can be. Yet they are 
supposed to be similar enough to humans that extrapolation from observations regarding them 
are supposed to provide strong evidential support for conclusions regarding humans.  
4.  The dilemma 
Laboratory behavioral research on non-human primates cannot provide a suitable model 
about which observations can be extrapolated to a target population, whether that target 
population is humans, other non-human primates, or to draw general conclusions about the 
history and evolution of species. The argument can be stated in the form of a dilemma. The 
dilemma is: (a) either non-human primates exhibit a relevant dissimilarity or they don’t; (b) if 
they don’t exhibit a relevant dissimilarity, then experimental conditions introduce a causally 
relevant variable, which confounds the results; (c) if they do exhibit a relevant dissimilarity, then 
the results cannot be generalized; thus, (d) either the results are confounded or they are not 
generalizable, which is to say that extrapolation is not justified. 
 Here is another way to put the point. Hoff and Stiglitz argue that there are two strands of 
behavioral economics.14 The first strand conceives of agents as quasi-rational actors whose 
behaviors are driven not only by incentives, but also by the context in the moment of the 
decision. Such contexts may be able to drive a wedge between the decisions that result from 
“slow” and “fast” thinking. The second strand conceives of agents as enculturated actors, actors 
whose preferences, cognition, and perception are not only shaped by “fast” and “slow” thinking, 
but by cultural mental models. According to this strand, what drives behavior is not limited to 
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incentives and context, but also includes the actor’s experience and exposure.15 These in turn 
create cultural mental models, which partly determine what aspects of a particular context will 
influence behavior. Hoff and Stiglitz offer compelling empirical evidence supporting this second 
strand of behavioral economics. 
 This distinction between strands is an instance of the dilemma above. If agents are 
enculturated and behavior is driven by experience and exposure, then unless the model and 
targets share the same experience and exposure, extrapolation from model to target will be 
confounded by the different social constructs influencing each population’s behavior. I’m 
claiming that the conditions of laboratory behavioral research guarantee that the experience and 
exposure differ between any model population and the target for extrapolation. The laboratory 
conditions change the experience and exposure of the non-human primate.  
One might argue that while non-human primates and humans are relevantly similar in that 
they are enculturated, laboratory settings don’t introduce causally relevant variables. The thought 
is that premise (b) above is false. However, this is tantamount to the claim that if humans were 
subjected to conditions similar to those found in the laboratory, being so subjected would not be 
causally relevant to human behavior. That is, being confined, coerced, separated socially, etc. 
would not alter behavior. If laboratory conditions are not causally relevant for non-human 
primate behavior, and non-human primates and humans are not relevantly different, then 
laboratory conditions are not causally relevant for human behavior. But we know that conditions 
resembling those of the laboratory (e.g., prison) are causally relevant to human behavior. Thus, it 
can’t be true that non-human primates are relevantly similar, that laboratory conditions are not 
causally relevant, and that conditions similar to those of the laboratory are causally relevant to 
human behavior. One of these propositions must be false. By stipulation the first proposition is 
true. The third proposition is empirically supported (see below). That only leaves the second 
proposition—that laboratory conditions are not causally relevant. 
The alternative is the other horn—that non-human primates are not enculturated agents. But 
then non-human primates would be a poor model for extrapolation. They’d be a poor model to 
extrapolate to humans, because humans are enculturated. And they’d be a poor model to 
extrapolate to other non-human primates for the purposes of identifying convergent or 
homologous behavior because we would know that behaviors in non-human primates have 
different drivers than behaviors in human primates—there would be at least two different 
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mechanisms at work—which defeats the pursuit of convergent or homologous behavior. Either 
way, the conclusions that result from extrapolations of observations of non-human primate 
behaviors in laboratory research are unjustified. 
 
4.1 The dilemma and chimpanzees 
 
Researchers have recently been experimenting on the behavior of chimpanzees using 
methods from behavioral economics. The experiments are supposed to measure moral 
psychological states and how choices are ordered. For example, researchers have played the 
Ultimatum Game with chimpanzees (among other species).16 The Ultimatum Game is played 
between two agents, a proposer and a responder. The proposer is endowed with some valuable 
fund. The proposer’s role is to offer a split of this fund with the responder. If the responder 
accepts, each agent receives their share of the proposed split. If the responder rejects the 
proposal, neither agent gets anything. The game is supposed to measure sensitivity to social 
goods such as fairness and cooperation. 
When the game is played with humans, the players must consent to participation. Setting 
aside the fact that the research would not get past an institutional review board without requiring 
participant consent, even if it could the observations would be of little value. Games such as the 
Ultimatum Game yield valuable results because participants’ behavior in them is not coerced. 
The absence of coercion is guaranteed only by an appropriate informed consent process. Without 
such a process, the participant’s behavior (his or her choices) cannot be interpreted as 
representative of his or her sensitivity to social or moral norms17, as it is plausible that their 
choices are influenced by their forced participation. Forced participation is a causally relevant 
variable in experimental economics. 
When chimpanzees (or any other non-human primate) play the Ultimatum Game (or any 
other similar game), can they consent to participation in the research? In other words, are they 
relevantly similar to humans in that they can consent? Or do they lack such a capacity and 
exhibit a relevant dissimilarity? Either way, extrapolation from observations from this research is 
not justifiable. 
In laboratory settings, chimpanzees do not provide consent to participate in research. If they 
are relevantly similar to humans and have the capacity to consent, then the experimental 
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conditions introduce a causally relevant variable that confounds the results. Whatever the 
observations are, if chimpanzees have the ability to consent, then there is no way to determine 
whether the observations are due to social behavior of chimpanzees or due to social behavior of 
chimpanzees and their forced participation. It would therefore not be possible to extrapolate to a 
target population that has the capacity to consent and whose participation is voluntary and 
informed. 
However, if chimpanzees lack the ability to consent, then the experimental conditions don’t 
introduce a causally relevant variable. Instead, the chimpanzees exhibit a causally relevant 
dissimilarity. Having the ability to consent is necessary for having autonomy. If chimpanzees 
lack the ability to consent, then they don’t have autonomy18. But in humans, autonomy also 
grounds our choices. For example, when humans play the Ultimatum Game, our behavior is a 
result of our making choices compatible with our freedom and power to do so and the 
preferences that emerge from our will—they result from our autonomy. When a person rejects an 
offer of 20% of the endowment, that’s an autonomous choice. If chimpanzees lack the ability to 
consent and so autonomy, then the source of their choices is a different mechanism than it is in 
humans. And if their behavior results from a different mechanism, then there is a causally 
relevant dissimilarity between chimpanzees and the population that is the target of the 
extrapolation. This causally relevant dissimilarity defeats the extrapolation from model to target. 
Thus, the extrapolation from chimpanzees to humans is either confounded or defeated. Either 
way, the inference is not justified. The only way an extrapolation from these observations can be 
justified is if the conclusion reached is about a population not relevantly dissimilar, such as 
imprisoned humans or other confined non-human primates. The alternative is to assert that the 
fact of confinement does not modulate observed behavior. This assertion, however, implies that 
such animals are poor models for extrapolation, since we know imprisonment can change 
cognition and behavior.19 
One might object that whether autonomy or freedom grounds human behavior is precisely 
what is under investigation when researchers play social preference games with chimpanzees, 
which means I can’t simply assume that human behavior is so grounded. This objection provides 
a useful foil for my argument. So long as human behavior is enculturated—so long as it is 
influenced by experience and exposure—the extrapolation is unjustified. If human behavior is 
enculturated, and chimpanzee behavior is not, then model and target are relevantly dissimilar, 
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which defeats the extrapolation. But if, like it is in humans, chimpanzee behavior is enculturated, 
then laboratory conditions introduce a confounding variable, which defeats the extrapolation 
from model to target. Thus, denying that human behavior is grounded by autonomous or free 
choice doesn’t free one from the dilemma.  
Even if human behavior is driven not by autonomous or free choice but merely by 
neurochemistry (presuming, maybe falsely, that freedom and neurochemical explanations of 
behavior are incompatible), so long as in humans experience and exposure act upon that 
neurochemistry, the problem remains. 20 The only way to avoid the dilemma entirely is to claim 
that laboratory conditions don’t introduce a confounding variable, because neither chimpanzee 
nor human behavior is influenced by experience and exposure. If that were true, one may 
justifiably extrapolate from chimpanzees in the lab to humans outside of it. But the defender of 
the claim that human behavior is not influenced by experience and exposure bears the significant 
burden of establishing it. 
Consider the Institute of Medicine’s recommendations for conditions under which using 
chimpanzees as subjects is acceptable. The first condition is that the knowledge be unattainable 
by other means. The second, however, is that the animal be acquiescent. Animals are acquiescent 
when they don’t “refuse or resist research-related interventions and that do not require physical 
or psychological threats for participation.”21 Of course, failing to refuse is not the same as 
consenting, particularly when the animal is confined and has been previously compelled. It’s 
fantasy to think that because a chimpanzee acquiesces to participation they are therefore 
“consenting” to participation, that distress is minimized, and that any confounders are controlled. 
It’s not difficult to imagine that a chimpanzee who has been “retired” to a particular facility but 
has been a subject in many other studies acquiescing to research because of their previous 
experience and exposure. My point is that whatever experience and exposure they have been 
subjected to previously affects not only whether the animal acquiesces, but also the behavioral 
outcome of interest, and this influence confounds extrapolation. The alternative is to hold that the 
chimpanzees’ experience and exposure do not so influence. But in that case the extrapolation is 
undermined by a relevant dissimilarity between the chimpanzee and the target, because in 
humans such behavior is influenced by experience and exposure. 
For example, Proctor et al. played the Ultimatum Game and the Dictator Game.22 The 
Dictator Game is similar to the Ultimatum Game, except that the recipient of the offer does not 
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have the opportunity to reject the proposal. They hypothesized that chimpanzees would propose 
more equal splits of tokens in the Ultimatum Game than in the Dictator Game, as there is a cost 
of having a proposal rejected in the Ultimatum Game, but no such cost in the Dictator Game. 
They found that chimpanzees proposed more equal splits in the Ultimatum Game. They validated 
this finding by conducting a similar experiment with children, concluding that the behavior is in 
common between chimpanzees and humans.  
However, no such extrapolation is epistemically justified. In addition to the fact that 
chimpanzees and humans exhibit a relevant dissimilarity in their ability to consent,23 it is 
possible that the children, as they often are in research, were sensitive not to the allocation of 
goods but to cues from authority figures. Similarly, the chimpanzees may have been also 
sensitive not to the allocation of goods, but to cues from authority figures. This needs to be 
controlled for any extrapolation to be justified. Second, the Ultimatum Game incorporates 
potential punishment for offering an unacceptable split. Both chimpanzees’ and the children’s 
past experience and exposure to punishment plausibly influenced their risk aversion. This needs 
to be controlled for any extrapolation to be justified. Third, the Ultimatum Game, but not the 
Dictator Game, is subject to framing effects—the words used to describe the behaviors to the 
players impact their behavior.24 If the children’s behavior was framed by the words used to 
describe the game, then there is clearly a relevant dissimilarity between chimpanzee and human, 
as the game is not communicated to chimpanzees in the same way as it is to humans (this is not 
to say that chimpanzees’ behavior is not framed by how it’s communicated). More generally, 
because experience and exposure do influence a child’s social behavior, experience and exposure 
need to be controlled across species. The alternative is to hold that they are relevantly different 
populations, which also undermines the extrapolation. In light of these considerations, any 
similarity in behavior looks accidental. 
The dilemma also defeats laboratory research in behavioral genetics and behavioral 
neuroscience using chimpanzees as models. Researchers have identified the gene AVPR1A as 
being associated with various behaviors. AVPR1A codes for a receptor of neuropeptide hormone 
arginine vasopressin (AVP). Researchers look for variations of this gene and associations this 
variation may have with behavioral observations. For example, some researchers observe 
chimpanzees’ “joint attention,” or their ability to communicate in a way that brings another 
agent’s attention to a stimulus of common interest.25 Others observe aggression and dominance,26 
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sociability,27 or personality.28 They find that variation in AVPR1A can account for some of the 
variation in behavior. The goal is to identify the genetic basis of primate social behavior. 
The problem is not that the results form a particular study are questionable. Whether 
variations in AVPR1A can explain some percentage of the variation in behavior among the 
chimpanzees is beside the present point. The problem is in extrapolating from those results. It’s 
impossible to extrapolate from the observation that some percentage of the variation in behavior 
is due to variation in AVPR1A to the conclusion that AVPR1A grounds variation in behavior in 
other primate species, because for extrapolation the relevant observation isn’t merely the 
percentage of variation accounted for. The relevant observation is that variation in AVPR1A 
accounts for some of the behavioral variation under that cultural mental model. Unless 
experience and exposure is held fixed from model to target, any extrapolation from model to 
target will be confounded.  
Further, laboratory conditions require that the subjects have experienced significant stress, 
perhaps from confinement and compulsion, or from past trauma. And stress interacts with the 
release of AVP.29 Thus, the conditions required to conduct the experiment introduce the 
confounding variables. In the absence of controlling for experience and exposure, it’s impossible 
to conclude that another primate species’ behavior would be accounted for by genetic variation at 
all. It’s conceivable that some experiences or exposures would overwhelm entirely any genetic 
driver of behavior. Or suppose that a given cultural mental model results in little variation of 
behavior. In that case, with little behavioral variation to account for, it would be impossible to 
say that variations in AVPR1A account for any variation in behavior. It’s also possible that in 
different cultural mental models the percentage of variation in behavior accounted for would be 
greater. Similarly, it’s possible that chimpanzees’ cultural mental model (for example, the model 
that results from the stress from confinement or trauma from past research compulsion) interacts 
epigenetically with AVPR1A.30  
That’s the first horn. But one might think that the extrapolation from chimpanzee to human 
isn’t confounded, because chimpanzees’ behavior isn’t influenced by cultural mental models in 
the way that other primates’ behavior is so influenced. The second premise (second horn) is that 
if the chimpanzees in the research are relevantly dissimilar, then the extrapolation is not 
generalizable. There would be a relevant dissimilarity, because for humans not only do 
experience and exposure influence behavior like sociability, but also high levels of stress and 
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chaos influence social behaviors epigenetically.31 If chimpanzees aren’t like this, then their 
behavior and humans’ behavior have different drivers, which is a relevant dissimilarity. If 
chimpanzee behaviors and human behaviors have different drivers, then there is good reason to 
believe that what is true of chimpanzee behavior is a poor indicator of what is true of human 
behavior, which defeats the extrapolation.  
This is true even if their observed behaviors are similar. Suppose that two people arrive at 
King’s Cross station, one by rail and one by tube. They’re both in the same place, but by way of 
different mechanisms. Studying how one of them arrived at King’s Cross to discover that she 
arrived by rail does nothing to tell us how the other (or anyone else also at the station) arrived. 
Similarly, if to avoid the first horn one holds instead that chimpanzee (or any other non-human 
primate) behavior and human behavior have different drivers (one for which experience and 
exposure are important), then studying one to learn about the other—even if their observed 
behaviors are the same—is like studying how one traveler arrived at King’s Cross to learn how 
the other arrived.32  
It’s not merely social behavior that genetics are supposed to account for. Other research 
indicates that variation in non-human primates’ fine motor skills and tool use can be explained 
genetically.33 This research faces the same dilemma, however. There’s strong evidence that the 
experience and exposure of human children affects various aspects of development. For example, 
chaos and trauma influence not only cognitive development, but also fine and gross motor 
skills.34 Further, strong parental nurturing doesn’t mitigate this influence. If chimpanzees are 
similar to humans in this regard, one would expect that the past trauma to social location and 
bodily integrity or the confinement and compulsion influence the development of fine and gross 
motor skills, as it would in human children.35 If so, then when one observes chimpanzees 
manipulate a tool in the laboratory, there’s no way to know whether the behavior is due to genes 
or due to genes and the cultural mental model that has developed from their experience and 
exposure. If cultural mental models so confound, then it’s impossible to extrapolate any 
association to other species that behave within a different model. The laboratory conditions (e.g., 
trauma, confinement, compulsion, social disruption) introduce causally relevant dissimilarities, 
which confound any extrapolation.  
The alternative is to hold that these laboratory conditions don’t confound. In that case, 
chimpanzee behavior has a relevantly different driver than human behavior, which undermines 
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the extrapolation. Either way, the extrapolation is not epistemically justified. 
In the case of behavioral economics and behavioral genetics, laboratory conditions introduce 
variables (social disruption, trauma, confinement, compulsion, stress, and the resulting cultural 
mental models) that confound the inferences one could make from the observations of behavior, 
defeating the extrapolation. The only way to avoid this confounding is to assert that experience 
and exposure don’t influence chimpanzees’ behaviors in the way that they do humans. But in that 
case there is a relevant difference between chimpanzees and humans, which defeats the 
extrapolation from the model to the target. Behavioral neuroscience faces the same dilemma. 
In their report on using chimpanzees in biomedical research, the Institute of Medicine uses as 
an example of licit research a study looking at the neurological homology of joint attention in 
humans and chimpanzees. In humans the area of interest is Broca’s area, which is asymmetrical 
and enlarged on the left side of the brain and activated by vocalization and gestures, the 
behaviors common to initiating joint attention. The study imaged the brains of chimpanzees 
while being presented with a stimulus know to provoke attempts at initiating joint attention.36 
They found similar patterns of activation as those found in humans.  
This study was an example of laboratory behavioral research on chimpanzees, but it wasn’t 
extrapolative. That is, the chimpanzees in this study were not being studied as a model for a 
target population. So the present dilemma doesn’t undermine the epistemology of this research, 
though there still might be reasons to think that the study introduced confounding variables, such 
as those that result from the manipulation of their experience and exposure. However, the 
Institute of Medicine concludes that “The presence of similarly activated underlying brain 
structures would suggest that chimpanzees could be used to model human communication 
development.”37 While this study may not itself be extrapolative, the IOM is explicit that others 
can use chimpanzees as a model for human communication. These further studies would be 
undermined by the present dilemma. Indeed, making explicit the chain of inferences clarifies the 
effect of the dilemma.  
The first inference is that since one type of communication is associated with activation of 
the same region of the brain in both humans and chimpanzees, chimpanzees and humans are 
similar in one relevant way. Using the chimpanzee as a model for the neurobiology of human 
communication, researchers then observe associations between images of the brain, for example, 
and communication behavior in chimpanzees. The next inference is that since chimpanzees are a 
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good model and some association (whatever it happens to be in a particular study) obtains 
between neurobiology and behavior in them, a similar association obtains in human. But it’s this 
second inference that the dilemma undermines. It’s undermined because if chimpanzees are 
relevantly similar to humans as the IOM asserts, then it’s plausible that their experience and 
exposure influence their communication behavior. It doesn’t take a well controlled experiment to 
know that a human being’s experience and exposure—and even their local environment—
influence their communication behaviors. If chimpanzees are relevantly similar, then it’s 
plausible that their experience and exposure influence their communication behaviors and thus 
any observed association those behaviors may have with imaged brain states. 
In some research the chimpanzees being researched are in sanctuaries or facilities that 
attempt to mimic heir natural environment. However, thinking that because a subject is at the 
time living in a facility that resembles their natural environment we don’t need to worry about 
confounding ignores the influence that past experience and exposure can have on behavior. 
Chimpanzees who are in sanctuaries are usually chimpanzees who have been retired from 
research or who have otherwise experienced trauma. There is perhaps no better guarantee that 
experience and exposure will confound extrapolation than to use chimpanzees who have lived 
chaotic, traumatic, and injured lives, unless the extrapolation is to a target that has had similar 
experience and exposure.  
I have only provided a few examples of laboratory behavioral research using chimpanzees 
extrapolation from which the dilemma undermines. But the problem generalizes: 
Any laboratory research that has an observation of chimpanzee behavior as the dependent 
variable will either be confounded by the subjects’ experience and exposure or be defeated by a 
causally relevant dissimilarity. This makes extrapolation impossible. And since extrapolation is 
impossible, there is very little knowledge to be gained.  
Using chimpanzees in behavioral research as models from which to extrapolate is not 
epistemically justified. The ethical justification for their use requires balancing the epistemology 
of their use with the animals’ welfare. I am only arguing that the epistemology of using them as 
animal models from which to extrapolate suggests there is nothing to be learned. If there is 
nothing to be learned, then any net harm to the animal will outweigh the benefits of their use, 
which implies that it is unethical to use them as animal models. Furthermore, some of the factors 
that harm the animals (e.g., confinement and coercion) may also undermine the epistemology. 
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But I am only concerned with these factors to the extent that they undermine the epistemology. 
Beyond the fact that the things that harm the animals may be the things that also undermine the 
epistemology of extrapolation, the welfare of the animals is irrelevant to the present purpose. 
  
 4.2 Other non-human primates 
 
 That the dilemma undermines extrapolations from well designed research using the animal 
thought to be most similar to humans suggests that it will also undermine extrapolations from 
more poorly designed research using less similar animals. Rhesus monkeys are commonly used 
as models, and a common type of experiment is the human intruder test. In the human intruder 
test, the animal is caged, then a human approaches the cage. Variations on the disposition of the 
human allow for manipulation of the experimental conditions. Responses, as measured by 
behavior or biometrics, are observed.  
Rhesus monkeys are presumably selected because they bear relevant similarities to target 
populations, such as other non-human primates or humans. These similarities presumably 
include similar psychologies. That is, the reason rhesus monkeys are chosen for experimentation 
using the human intruder test is that they are psychologically similar to the target population. The 
human intruder test requires that the animals be confined. We know that confinement affects the 
psychology of members of the target populations.38 If the rhesus monkey doesn’t exhibit any 
relevant dissimilarities, then their confinement can be expected to affect their psychology, 
though maybe not in exactly the same way as it does in the target population. If the observation 
of interest is causally relevant to confinement, then the experimental conditions introduce a 
variable that is causally relevant. And doing this confounds the results.  
Suppose that the experiment calls for a stranger to approach the cage, and the observation is 
whether the animal retreats, maintains its position, or moves to the front of the cage. When the 
stranger approaches the cage and the animal is observed retreating, there is no way to distinguish 
whether this is due to anxiety about strangers or anxiety about strangers and being confined. In 
other relevantly similar animals, being confined interacts with anxiety just as other experience 
and exposure interact with the communication behaviors or sociability. If rhesus monkeys are 
relevantly similar, there is no way to eliminate this possibility. That is, whatever the observation 
is, there is no way to determine whether the observation is due to the independent variable or to 
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the conjunction of the fact that the animal is confined and the independent variable. If the 
observation is so confounded, then there is no justification to extrapolate from these observations 
to a target population that isn’t confined.39 
However, if the rhesus monkey is unlike other species, such as humans, and being confined 
has no effect on its behavior, then they exhibit a causally relevant dissimilarity (in humans, 
confinement has certain downstream effects on behavior). If they exhibit causally relevant 
dissimilarities, then one cannot justifiably extrapolate from those observations to target 
populations that are so relevantly dissimilar, such as humans, chimpanzees, or any other animal 
for whom confinement affects behavior. Either way, then, one cannot extrapolate from 
observations of the rhesus monkey in the human intruder test to humans (even if the observation 
is something as simple as cortisol level). 
 Another example of rhesus monkeys being used in laboratory behavioral research is a recent 
study investigating the effect of oxytocin on their ability to recognize faces. Oxytocin is a 
neuropeptide implicated in a wide range of social behaviors. Researchers found that in rhesus 
monkeys oxytocin did affect their facial recognition.40 But the laboratory conditions confound 
any useful inference. In humans, oxytocin makes social cues more salient.41 But being separated 
and confined plausibly also affects which social cues are salient. Indeed, it takes mental 
gymnastics to think that oxytocin might change social behavior but also think that confinement 
and coercion don’t. The study assumes that rhesus monkeys, like humans, are affected by 
administration of an intranasal neuropeptide but that they aren’t affected by their experience and 
exposure. If both of these assumptions are true, then the rhesus monkey’s social behavior 
operates differently than a human’s, because human behavior is affected by experience and 
exposure. 
 Confinement to a cage introduces a confounding variable in animals that are potential target 
populations for extrapolation from non-human primate research. One could ease this 
confounding by not confining the animal. Some researchers do this, producing results from 
which one can extrapolate but that are logistically and experimentally difficult to acquire. Thus, 
some animals that are supposed to be relevantly similar to humans, such as chimpanzees, 
bonobos, and orangutans, are confined not to cages but larger research centers that more closely 
resemble their natural environments.  
 For example, Parker et al. conducted a study on AVP concentration and sociability of rhesus 
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monkeys, but the monkeys were all born and bred in large outdoor facilities within complex 
social groups.42 Their hypothesis was that there would be a difference in AVP concentration in 
cerebrospinal fluid between low-social monkeys and high-social monkeys. The behavioral 
outcomes in this study were ethological observations of sociability (e.g., grooming, play). They 
found that AVP concentration could discriminate between low- and high-social monkeys. 
However, even in such well designed studies (this is likely as good as a controlled environment 
can get), the dilemma undermines the extrapolation. While the physical environment may have 
been very similar to the monkeys’ natural environment, and the monkeys were born and bred in 
it, the social environment was artificial, and this may influence the sociability of individual 
monkeys. Also, while the study made the behavioral observations prior to collecting the sample, 
collecting the sample plausibly influenced the monkey’s subsequent sociability—it’s plausible 
that being caught in their home, drugged, and tapped in a lab for cerebrospinal fluid influences 
subsequent behavior so that future behavioral observations are potentially confounded by earlier 
research participation. It’s not clear whether the monkeys in this study had participated in 
previous research and if so, what those conditions were.  
The reasons that we use non-human primates are at odds with what we hope to learn by 
studying their behavior under experimental conditions. There is tension between the reasons for 
their accessibility (e.g., they’re easy to confine, compel, injure, breed, euthanize) and the 
conclusions we intend to draw about the behavior of other primates outside of experimental 
conditions. Anytime an animal model is chosen because of some relevant similarities it bears to a 
target population, and the experimental conditions manipulate those similarities in the model but 
not the target, researchers will face the above dilemma. This true of all animal models, not just 
non-human primates. For example, if a Fischer rat is chosen because it metabolizes a certain 
drug like humans do, then if the experimental conditions manipulate that metabolism in the rat, 
then either the subsequent extrapolation would be confounded or the rat would actually bear a 
relevant dissimilarity to humans.  
 
5. Potential Targets 
 
 If non-human primates are being used as animal models, what, then are suitable target 
populations to which one can extrapolate? The answer will of course depend on the relevant 
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similarities and differences between model and target. To control for experience and exposure, 
the target population would have to have had similar experience and exposure. Humans who may 
exhibit few relevant dissimilarities are those who have spent significant time confined, such as 
prisoners. However, prisoners are a highly protected group of people, and it’s unlikely they will 
have been exposed to participation in so much research. Another population that might exhibit 
fewer relevant dissimilarities in experience and exposure are children who have been removed 
by various states from their families and placed in artificial social environments, such as children 
of Indigenous Peoples, Aborigines, or Latin American immigrants attempting to cross the United 
States’ southern border. However, such populations’ confinement is typically temporary, which 
is likely to produce relevant dissimilarities in cultural mental models. Notwithstanding the 
significant ethical standards research on these populations would violate, it’s unlikely that any 
such extrapolation from non-human primates in the laboratory to humans will be epistemically 
justified. 
Above I mentioned that one of the purposes of laboratory behavioral research on non-human 
primates is to establish the evolutionary history of primate behavior. The above argument has 
implications for this pursuit. Indeed, it seems to entail that it is impossible to ever discover that 
behavior is homologous or conserved through evolution from species’ common ancestor. How 
would researchers make such a discovery in the laboratory? It would require that the species that 
are supposed to exhibit the homologous behavior all respond to the laboratory conditions in a 
similar way. Since we know that these conditions can influence human behavior, for this 
behavior to be homologous other species’ behavior would also need to be similarly influenced. 
But, as above, this confounds the observations and undermines the inference that the observed 
behavior is homologous.  
The alternative is that some species’ (i.e., humans) behavior is influenced by the laboratory 
conditions, and other species’ is not. If this is true, then this dissimilarity would fail to support an 
inference that the observed behavior is homologous and may instead support convergence, if 
anything. 
6. Conclusion 
I do not argue that all extrapolation from non-human primates is epistemically unjustified. 
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The above argument only threatens the epistemology of laboratory behavioral research on non-
human primates that uses non-human primates as animal models. It undermines the 
extrapolation, so if some laboratory behavioral research on non-human primates infers its 
conclusions some other way, then this research is unaffected by the above argument. For 
example, some research may use non-human primates to generate hypotheses rather than provide 
a model from which to extrapolate to a target population. The above argument would not 
undermine such research. However, if testing these hypotheses inevitably requires testing them 
on non-human primates who are then used as models from which to extrapolate, then it’s not 
clear that even this exploratory research is epistemically justified. 
 Extrapolating from observations of non-human primates acquired by way of field 
experiments or ethological observation is also not threatened, so long as the conditions of 
research don’t introduce other confounding variables. Field or ethological research may even 
provide the best models for extrapolation, given that the observed behaviors occur in the species’ 
natural environment.43 There may be other epistemological reasons to be dubious of research 
outside of the lab. And there may be ethical and logistical reasons why such research either 
shouldn’t or can’t be conducted. But I have not identified any of these. The above argument is 
merely an epistemological argument that extrapolation from non-human primates in laboratory 
behavioral research is not justified. 
The above argument also doesn’t address the epistemology of invasive biomedical research 
on non-human primates. Such research is not likely to continue to occur using chimpanzees, but 
it is still commonplace for other species to be used as animal models. I discussed briefly above 
some of the epistemological problems with using animal models that others have identified, but I 
don’t add anything. However, if ever animal models are used based on a similarity to the target, 
and the experimental conditions of the research manipulate that similarity in the model, the 
research will face the dilemma identified above. For example, Garner provides an impressive list 
of all of the ways in which caged environments of mice and rats influence the values of 
dependent variables in biomedical research. He writes further that “animals in barren, 
uncontrollable environments are models of chronically stressed, socially isolated, and immune-
suppressed humans; but, if we want good models of most human cancer patients receiving 
physical and social supportive care, then we need to think carefully about the social and physical 
enrichment of these animals.”44 I am arguing that the same is true of behavioral research using 
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non-human primates. 
Garner also argues that the development of animal models in behavioral neuroscience, 
presumably including those using non-human primates, ought to adopt methods of human 
clinical trials so that the failure rate of translational research is not so high. However, if animal 
models are adapted so that they more closely resemble human clinical trials, it is difficult to see 
how these can be carried out in the laboratory. Human clinical trials do not typically confine and 
compel their subjects or significantly disrupt their social lives; they don’t trap and drug or 
otherwise impose significant interventions on subjects’ experience and exposure. Behavioral 
research that more closely resembles human clinical trials would look very much like field 
research—observing non-human primates in their natural environments and social locations.45  
The epistemology of using non-human primates as animal models in laboratory behavioral 
research informs the ethics of using them. The ethical justification for any research that requires 
subjects to bear a burden is that the research provide a benefit. The burden must be proportional 
to the expected benefit. The epistemology of extrapolation from laboratory research using non-
human primates says there’s nothing to be gained. If there’s nothing to be gained, then there is 
little ethical justification for using them as research subjects.  
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